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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
NO. 11-2948
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BARI LYNN BERGER,
also known as Biealie Angel Mele
also known as Angel Mele
also known as Bari Lynn Manahan
also known as Biealia Angel Mele
also known as Biealia Angel Deseria
also known as Bari Lynn Hurd
also known as Bari Lynn Elkind,
Bari Lynn Berger,
Appellant

____________

Appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
District Court No. 2:10-cr-00349
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 27, 2012
_____________

BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., ROTH, and TASHIMA *, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: August 3, 2012)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Bari Lynn Berger appeals from the sentence imposed by the District
Court. Berger pled guilty to one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. ' 1341, and one count of
wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. ' 1343. These charges stem from a scheme whereby Berger and
her criminal associate, Gerald Radomski, stole more than $1.7 million from friends,
neighbors, and acquaintances. Radomski was prosecuted separately and also pled guilty.
Berger contends that the District Court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(C) when it
failed to give her notice that it intended to rely on testimony from Radomski=s prior
sentencing hearing in determining her sentence.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291 and 18 U.S.C. ' 3742(a). Because
the parties are familiar with the facts and prior proceedings, we set them forth only to the
extent necessary to an understanding of our discussion of the issues.

*

Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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I.
Berger and Radomski concocted a captivating story: Berger was said to be the
illegitimate daughter of a wealthy business tycoon who had left her a $2 billion
inheritance. But Berger could not inherit that money until she fulfilled several conditions
in her father=s will. Before Berger could receive the inheritance, she first had to pay her
bills, establish a permanent home, and receive medical care. From January 2008 to
January 2009, Berger and Radomski solicited money for the ostensible purpose of helping
Berger meet these conditions, so that she could receive, and then share, her inheritance.
They promised a 1000 to 1 return on investment.
After the scheme unraveled in March 2009, both Radomski and Berger were
prosecuted and both pled guilty. Although the two cases were separately prosecuted, both
cases were assigned to the same District Judge. Radomski=s sentencing hearing was held
on April 11, 2011 and Berger=s sentencing hearing on July 11, 2011. Berger=s
Presentence Investigation Report (APSR@) calculated her advisory guideline range as 5163 months. The government concedes that there was no mention of Radomski=s
sentencing proceedings in the PSR or in the sentencing memoranda submitted by the
parties. Berger was sentenced to 60 months= imprisonment and three years of supervised
release. She was also ordered to pay restitution of over $1.7 million.
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Berger had requested a downward departure on the ground of diminished capacity,
given her history of mental health issues. But the District Court placed little value on
reports from Berger=s doctors, because their diagnoses and opinions were based on
Berger=s self-reported symptoms. The District Court explained that Berger=s Ahazy
memory and reluctance to give anybody information@ indicated that Ashe is not a reliable
relator.@ The District Court denied Berger=s request for a downward departure.
The court was skeptical that Berger=s doctors would have known enough, without
reliable self-reports from Berger, to provide useful findings. The court asked ACould the
doctors have any idea what I=ve just heard from two of the victims? Could they have any
idea what Mr. Radomski said at his hearing?@ The court also admonished Berger, stating
that A[y]ou are the one that perpetrated this fraud along with Mr. Radomski, who found
out that your weren=t sick and you weren=t an heiress and there weren=t three judges in
Orphan=s Court in Philadelphia and some court employee was not extorting you.@ Berger
contends that these statements by the court demonstrate that the court relied on
information from Radomski=s separate sentencing hearing in determining Berger=s
sentence.
Because Berger did not object to this alleged error during her sentencing hearing,
the error was not preserved. Berger raises this issue for the first time in this appeal.
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II.
This Court applies a plain error standard of review to unpreserved objections
arising out of sentencing hearings. United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir.
2001). Under this standard, A[we] may . . . set aside [Berger=s] sentence only if: (1) the
District Court erred; (2) the court's error was clear or obvious; (3) [Berger] can show that
the error affected [her] substantial rights, i.e., that it prejudiced [her]; and (4) not
correcting the error would seriously impair the fairness, integrity, or reputation of a
judicial proceeding.@ United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 2001).
III.
In this case, we need not decide whether the District Court clearly erred, because
Berger cannot show that any error affected her substantial rights.
A defendant establishes that an error affected her substantial rights by showing
Athat the District Court would have imposed a lesser sentence had defense counsel been
given the required notice.@ Id. at 470. The defendant Abears the burden of demonstrating
that he was prejudiced by the District Court=s error.@ Nappi, 243 F.3d at 770.
Berger argues that, had she been given notice, she Awould have entirely discredited
Radomski=s claim that Ms. Berger duped him into participating in the fraud.@ Berger says
she would have called Radomski to the stand and confronted him with his sworn
admission that he was behind the scheme. Berger argues that by pointing out these
5

inconsistencies to the court, she would have persuaded the court that she was not in
charge of the scheme, and thus she would have received a lighter sentence.
Even if we accept that Berger would have called Radomski to the stand and
thoroughly discredited him, Berger cannot show that this would have convinced the court
to grant a downward departure or otherwise lessen her sentence. First, the District Court
had already expressed skepticism about Radomski=s testimony and accused him of
habitual dishonesty. It is thus doubtful that the court placed much weight on Radomski=s
testimony in the first place, and Berger would not have been able to change the court=s
perception of Radomski by showing his inconsistent statements.
Second, the District Court never determined that Berger bore more responsibility
for the fraud. In fact, the court=s statements indicated that it viewed both Berger and
Radomski as responsible for the crime. The court said: AYou [Berger] are the one that
perpetrated this fraud, along with Mr. Radomski,@ and that A[t]his is a rather extensive
fraud scheme . . . The defendants, Mr. Radomski and Ms. Berger, are not the victims.@
Moreover, Berger and Radomski received the same sentence, 60 months= imprisonment
and three years of supervised release. Thus, the record does not indicate that the District
Court viewed Berger as more responsible than Radomski.
Third, Berger=s argument takes the court=s comments out of context. The court
was explaining that it would not rely on reports from Berger=s doctors, because those
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reports were unreliable. And those reports were unreliable because Berger had not been
forthcoming with her doctors. In addition, the doctors had Avery little to use for
evaluation except self-report by the defendant.@ The court emphasized that the doctors=
reports were unreliable because Berger had been reluctant to give anybody information,
and Adoesn=t tell anybody anything.@ The court=s point, in mentioning Radomski=s
testimony, was not that it knew something material that the doctors did not (the content of
Radomski=s testimony), but rather that the doctors did not have any information on which
to base their findings. Had Berger discredited Radomski, the Court still would have
found the doctors= reports unhelpful, because Berger had not provided the doctors with
the information they needed to make a reliable diagnosis.
But even if the court had found the doctors= reports helpful, there is little
likelihood that they would have affected its denial of Berger=s downward departure
request. The court had already recognized Berger=s Acognitive deficits.@ Even in light of
those deficits, the court stated that A[t]here are countless fraud cases where defendants try
to explain their detailed, intentional behavior as diminished capacity.@ The court denied
the request for a downward departure because Berger Aknew she wasn=t working, she
knew she was getting money and she was giving it away, and the money that she was
getting, she had to play a role for.@ The court denied the downward departure because
Berger knew that what she was doing was wrong. Radomski=s testimony, which Berger
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says she would have adduced, would not have changed this outcome.
Berger has not made a showing that, had the court given defense counsel notice,
the District Court would have imposed a lesser sentence. See United States v. Hart, 273
F.3d 363, 380 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that it was not enough for the defendant to show
Athat [he] may have been able to rebut evidence,@ because he Amust show that the District
Court would have imposed a lesser sentence had defense counsel been given the required
notice@) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original). Thus, Berger has
not shown that any error under Rule 32(i)(1)(C) affected her substantial rights.
We, therefore, will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court.
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